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Spec i a l  Fea tu re
Since the end of the 1980s, relations with China haveplayed a major part in the economic development ofTaiwan. As a new land of opportunity for the island’s
investors, it helped many small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) to maintain their competitiveness in overseas markets
by allowing them to produce at lower cost. In so doing, it
boosted the restructuring of the Taiwanese economy, which
was then able, with the support of the authorities, to turn to
more technological industries with higher added value. To
major companies that were a bit constricted in Taiwan, China
offered opportunities for expansion thanks to the enormous
market located right on their doorstep. It supported the is-
land’s overseas trade by compensating for the fall in Tai-
wanese exports to the American and Japanese markets,
whether in finished consumer products or in intermediate
products, in the framework of a process of division of labour
between the two shores of the Taiwan Strait. All this meant
growing Taiwanese dependence on the Chinese economy.
This situation would probably be nothing unusual if Taiwan
and China were two friendly countries simply seeking to ben-
efit mutually from economic opportunities. However, rela-
tions between Taipei and Beijing are marked by a dispute
that has remained unresolved since 1949, and which tends to
link economic interests to political interests. This is why the
project for a China-Taiwan economic zone in the framework
of the ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agree-
ment / Liang’an jingji hezuo jiagou xieyi) proposed by Tai-
wanese President Ma Ying-jeou, who has held office since
May 2008, is so sensitive and has aroused so much contro-
versy. The policy towards the mainland followed by succes-
sive governments up to 2008, whether Kuomintang (KMT)
or Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has indeed led to a
liberalisation of trade across the Strait, but this has happened
gradually and in a limited fashion. Ma Ying-jeou, for his part,
wants the ECFA to be the means to speedy and comprehen-
sive liberalisation. Is this an appropriate answer to the diffi-
culties of the Taiwanese economy? Is Taiwan not more likely
to suffer more than it benefits from the economic power of its
big neighbour? Couldn’t economic integration with China
compromise the island’s political independence? These are
some of the questions raised by the project.
After recalling how adjustment of the island’s economy
translated into massive foreign investment between 1988 and
1990, which laid the foundation for the conversion of Tai-
wanese industry to information technology (IT) on the one
hand, and for closer economic relations with China on the
other (two drivers in Taiwan’s sustained economic growth
during the 1990s), we will seek to explain to what extent the
structural weaknesses of the Taiwanese economy hampered
its growth during the 2000s, particularly during the dotcom
bubble of 2001 and the financial crash in 2008-2009. Fi-
nally, we will consider the relevance of the ECFA as an an-
swer to the economic problems, as well as its implications on
a political level.Industr ia l  restructur ing  andincreasing  dependence  onChina
After the Second World War, taking advantage of the legacy
of 50 years of Japanese colonisation, as well as an active
state policy of import substitution and then export promo-
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The Taiwanese economic miracle is over. At the end of the 1980s, changes in macroeconomic conditions forced
Taiwanese industry to restructure. While it moved towards information technology, the island became increasingly
tied to the mainland. By speeding up the integration of Taiwan with China by means of a China-Taiwan economic
zone, President Ma Ying-jeou hopes to restart growth, but the economic and political consequences of the project are
causing controversy.
Spec i a l  Fea tu re
tion, (1) Taiwan experienced exceptional growth for 35 years
(averaging 8.8 percent per year between 1951 and 1987), (2)
which was sometimes termed an economic miracle. (3) How-
ever, at the end of the 1980s, this development model based
on the export of labour-intensive goods, labour being a factor
of production that was plentiful and cheap on the island until
then, began to show signs of slowing down, with annual
growth averaging 7.6 percent between 1988 and 1990. (4)
The island’s companies at that time were confronted on the
one hand with rising labour costs in Taiwan, mainly due to a
shortage of manpower, (5) and on the other with a strong rise
in the Taiwanese currency (the New Taiwan Dollar or NTD)
whose value, under pressure both internal (with an exchange
rate that less and less reflected the technological progress
boasted by local industry) and external (the US threatened
protectionist measures unless Taipei adopted a monetary pol-
icy aimed at reducing the American trade deficit), (6) rose by
almost 40 percent over two years. (7) This situation led to a fall
in the competitiveness of Taiwanese export companies, which
were facing new competition from Southeast Asia.
The economic adjustment necessitated by the change in
macroeconomic conditions proved brutal. (8) In the context of
strong growth in foreign exchanges reserves and extreme
market liquidity, pressure on the island’s economy was re-
leased in the form of a wave of direct investment abroad, of
which Southeast Asia, China, and the US received between
two-thirds and three-quarters. (9) While the choice of the
Southeast Asian countries and China among the low-wage
countries is explained by geographical proximity or cultural
affinity (shared languages—Minnan (10) and Mandarin—in
China, large overseas Chinese communities in Southeast
Asia), Taiwanese investment in the US was justified by the
determination to establish markets for Taiwanese products
and, a newer phenomenon, to acquire new technology. In-
deed, the adjustment of the Taiwanese economy called for
the transition from standardised to cutting-edge technology.
As the market is often imperfect for this procedure, some of
the island’s companies chose to internalise R&D by invest-
ing on the other side of the Pacific. (11) In April 1989, the is-
land’s government finally opted for a flexible exchange rate
mechanism: the Taiwanese currency found a balance at 26.2
NTD to the US dollar in 1989, followed by 27.1 NTD to
the US dollar in 1990. (12) The stock market crash in Octo-
ber 1990 marked a temporary stop to the explosion in out-
ward investment.
The pursuit of the restructuring took the form of a conver-
sion of Taiwanese industry to IT. (13) This was facilitated by
the state through the stimulation of R&D. (14) In 1973, it
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1. Joseph S. Lee, “The Role of State in Economic Restructuring and Development: The
Case of Taiwan,” Occasional Paper Series (CIER), No. 9403, April 1994, pp. 3-11.
2. GDP, constant 2006 prices in NTD. Calculation based on Statistical Abstract of National
Account (SANA), Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS),
Executive Yuan, ROC, http://eng.stat.gov.tw. This growth happened in the framework of a
profound transformation of the Taiwanese economy: while foodstuffs (sugar, rice, tea,
bananas, tinned goods, and seafood) accounted for 87.1 percent of the island’s exports
in 1952, they amounted to only 1.2 percent in 1987. They had been replaced by electric
machines and appliances (25.2 percent), textile products (16.7 percent), plastic products
(8.7 percent), and metal products (6 percent). Taiwan Statistical Data Book (TSDB),
Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), Taipei, ROC, 1988, pp. 228-229.
3. Denis Fred Simon, Michael Y.M. Kau (eds.), Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle,
Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1992.
4. GDP at constant 2006 prices in NTD. Calculation based on SANA, DGBAS, op. cit. 
5. Hui-lin Wu, Ke-jeng Lan, “Labor Shortage and Foreign Workers in Taiwan,” Discussion
Paper (CIER), No. 9109, October 1991, pp. 30.
6. US$9.8 billion in 1984; 16 billion US$ in 1987. TSDB, 1997, p. 194.
7. 39.9 NTD/US$ in 1985; 28.6 NTD/US$ in 1987. TSDB, 1997, op. cit., p. 4.
8. For a detailed analysis of the process of adjustment of the Taiwanese economy between
1988 and 1990, Philippe Chevalérias, La marche des firmes taiwanaises vers le conti-
nent chinois (1987-1997), Paris, INALCO, Doctoral thesis, October 1999, pp. 257-266.
9. 1988-1990, (US$) total: 16.3 billion [a]; Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Thailand, Vietnam): 8.7 billion (53.4 percent) [b]; China: 1.9 billion (11.7 percent) [c]; US:
1.1 billion (6.7 percent) [d]. In fact, it is extremely difficult to give a reliable estimate of
each country’s share of these investments, since the figures come from a range of
sources: (total) balance of payments of Taiwan; (Southeast Asia, China) investment con-
tracts signed by Taiwanese companies as registered in the host countries; (US) invest-
ment projects approved by the Taiwanese authorities, i.e., the Ministry of Economic
Affairs (MOEA). However we prefer not to use the MOEA’s figures for the investments in
Southeast Asia (US$849 million) [d] or in China (US$647 million) [e] for the period 1988-
1990 because many Taiwanese businessmen at the time invested in these regions with-
out seeking the approval of the MOEA (Taipei still considered investment in China to be
illegal), so it is certain that these figures are well below the reality. [a] Balance of
Payments ROC, Taiwan District, The Central Bank of China; [b] Industrial Development
and Investment Center (IDIC), MOEA, Taiwan; [c] Liang’an jingji tongji yuebao (LJTY)
(Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly), Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), Taiwan; [d]
Statistics on Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment, Outward Investment, Mainland
Investment, Investment Commission, MOEA, Taiwan; [e] Lee-In Chen, “The Economic
Reunion of Taiwan and the Mainland China: The Impact on Industrial Development,”
Discussion Paper (CIER), No. 9203, May 1992, p. 23.
10. “Minnan” is spoken in Fujian, where many Taiwanese originate.
11. Tain-Jy Chen, “Taiwan’s Direct Foreign Investment: Patterns and Effects on Trade,”
paper presented at the Kyushu University International Symposium, Japan, Fukuoka, 27-
28 July 1992, p. 25.
12. TSDB, 1997, op. cit., p. 4.
13. The beginnings of the Taiwanese electronics industry go back to the 1960s, when for-
eign companies, mostly American and Japanese, came to set up on the island in order
to take advantage of relatively cheap local labour and a rapidly expanding domestic
market. At that time, many of them chose to establish joint ventures that included tech-
nology transfer to their local partners. This was the case of the Japanese company
Matsushita Electric (Songxia dianqi), which went into partnership in October 1962 with
the Taiwanese company Jianlong Electric (Jianlong dianqi dian) for the production and
sale first of radios, tape recorders, and microphones, and then of automatic cookers,
electric fans, black and white TVs, etc. This joint venture was called Matsushita Electric
Taiwan (Taiwan songxia dianqi). This was a first step, since in January 1966 the
Japanese company created in Taiwan (with another Taiwanese partner, the Wang fami-
ly) another joint venture called Taimatsu Industrial (Taisong gongye), which specialised
in the manufacture of batteries. Other subsidiaries were set up on the island in 1976,
1981, 1990, 1992, 1995, and 2000 [a]. In the 1970s Taiwanese SMEs organised into
networks began to manufacture electronic products such as calculators and telephones.
Building on the experience acquired from foreign firms and a system of organisation into
networks that was perfectly suited to short production cycles (flexibility and fast
response capability), they moved up-market in the beginning of the 1980s with the
manufacture of colour TVs and Personal Computers (PCs). [a] Information gathered by
the author directly from Matsushita; [b] Tamio Hattori, Yukihito Sato, “A Comparative
Study of Development Mechanisms in Korea and Taiwan: Introductory Analysis,” The
Developing Economies, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, December 1997, p. 351.
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The Taiwanese Economy After the Miracle
founded the Industrial Technology Research Institute
(ITRI), (15) a publicly-funded body aimed at promoting inno-
vation in Taiwan. In the framework of this institute was es-
tablished a centre for the development of the electronics in-
dustry (dianzi gongye fazhan zhongxin), later renamed the
Electronic Research and Service Organization (ERSO)
(Gongyanyuan dianzi suo). In 1976 the ITRI signed an
agreement with the US company RCA, which called for the
transfer of Complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor
(CMOS) technology that was to form the basis of the semi-
conductor industry on the island. (16) Taiwanese engineers
trained at RCA were appointed to the head of ERSO,
where they carried out internal adaptation of this technol-
ogy. This made possible the creation in 1979, under the im-
pulse of the ITRI, of the United Microelectronics Corpora-
tion (UMC) (Lianhua dianzi), which was to specialise in
the manufacture of silicon wafers (also called foundry
wafers). The following year, taking Silicon Valley as a
model, the island’s government established the Hsinchu Sci-
ence-based Industrial Park, (17) where high-tech companies
could avail themselves of inexpensive industrial infrastructure
(sites, buildings, water, and energy sources), an attractive tax
rate, and financial support for their R&D.
These government initiatives encouraged a spin-off effect in the
integrated circuit (IC) industry. ITRI was the origin of the es-
tablishment of another company in 1987, the Taiwan Semicon-
ductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) (Taiwan jiti 
dianlu), which became the first Taiwanese manufacturer of 
6-inch silicon wafers (18) and the first OEM (19) subcontractor in
the world for the manufacturing of IC chips. The same year,
one of the first engineers recruited by the ITRI, Yang Ting-
yuan, went over to the private sector to found Winbond Elec-
tronics Corporation (WEC) (Huabang dianzi). A manufac-
turer of microprocessors (Intel 286, 386, 486) and silicon
wafers at the end of the 1980s, WEC developed in the 1990s
on the one hand by acquiring US firms such as the California-
based Information Storage Devices (ISD), which specialised
in IC vocal recording devices (1998), and on the other by part-
nerships with Japanese companies such as Toshiba for the de-
sign and manufacturing of DRAM (Dynamic Random Access
Memory) and SRAM (Static Random Access Memory)
chips (1995, 1996, 1999, 2000), and Sharp for the develop-
ment of high-density flash memory (2001). (20)
Taiwan thus became a renowned IT centre. The manufac-
ture of printed circuit boards and IC packages took off on
the island in 1982; laptop manufacture in 1988, silicon
wafers in 1989, computer disks and mobile phones in
1994. (21) In 2008, 99 percent of netbooks, 92.5 percent of
laptops and motherboards, 90.2 percent of cable modems,
89 percent of Wireless LAN network interface cards, 76.1
percent of voice-over IP routers, and 69.1 percent of Inter-
net Protocol Phones sold on the world market were manu-
factured by Taiwanese companies. (22)
This profound transformation of Taiwanese industry went
hand-in-hand with Taiwan’s increasing economic dependence
on China. In July 1985, after a 35-year ban, the island’s gov-
ernment once again authorised trade between the two sides
of the Strait (23) on the condition that goods transit through a
third territory (Hong Kong or Macau) and that the goods
concerned not be detrimental to Taiwan’s national security or
its economy. (24) This stimulated trade, which reached US$1.5
billion in 1987. (25) In July 1987, the lifting of martial law by
Chiang Ching-kuo encouraged the island’s companies, which
were being pushed into off-shoring by the economic situation
in order to reduce production costs, to invest on the other
side of the Strait (US$1.9 billion between 1988 and
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14. Yeo Lin, “Industrial Structure, Technical Change, and the Role of Government in
Development of the Electronics and Information Industry in Taipei, China,” ERD Working
Paper Series (Asian Development Bank), No. 41, May 2003, pp. 24-35.
15. Gongye jishu yanjiuyuan: Industrial Technology Research Institute.
16. ITRI (Taiwan), http://www.itri.org.tw.
17. Xinzhu kexue gongye yuanqu: Hsinchu Science Park.
18. ITRI (Taiwan), http://www.itri.org.tw.
19. Original Equipment Manufacturing. It is a contract under the terms of which a company
manufactures a product designed by another company, which then markets it under its
own brand.
20. WEC, http://www.winbond.com.tw. Among the initiatives of the ITRI stimulating a spin-
off effect is the establishment of the Union of Notebook Manufacturers (Bijixing diannao
lianmeng), i.e., 47 companies vertically integrated in the production process (1990), and
the establishment of Vanguard International Semiconductor Corporation (VISC) (Shijie
xianjin jiti dianlu), the first Taiwanese manufacturer of 8-inch silicon wafers (1994). ITRI
(Taiwan), http://www.itri.org.tw.
21. TSDB, 2009, p. 113.
22. Institute for Information Industry (III), 2009 Quanqiu zitongxun chanye fazhan qushi xilie
yanjiuhui (2009 Conference Series on the Development Trend of the World Information
and Telecommunication Industry) – ICT Day, Taipei, III, MIC, 25 November 2008 (unpag-
inated document).
23. Trade between Taiwan and China was interrupted after the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek and
the Kuomintang to Taiwan in December 1949, and the bombardment of Quemoy (Kinmen)
by the Communist forces in 1954 and 1958. At the end of the 1970s, the economic reforms
implemented by Deng Xiaoping in China restarted trade across the Strait via Hong Kong [the
volume of which increased sevenfold between 1979 (US$78 million) and 1984 (US$553
million), while remaining illegal in the eyes of Taipei. LJTY (MAC, Taiwan), op. cit.
24. Three Basic Principles for Indirect Trade via Hong Kong and Macao (Dui Gang Ao diqu
zhuankou maoyi san jiben yuanze).
25. LJTY (MAC, Taiwan), op. cit.
26. Note 11.
27. The martial law decreed in May 1949 by Chiang Kai-shek forbade all contact with the
Communist enemy. Despite the risks, 80 investment contracts, amounting to US$100
million were nonetheless signed by Taiwanese businessmen in China between 1983 and
1987. The abolition of martial law did not in any way mean that the island’s entrepre-
neurs could invest freely on the Chinese mainland. Li Fei, Haixia liang’an jingmao guanxi
(Economic and Trade Relations between the Two Sides of the Strait), Beijing, Duiwai
maoyi jiaoyu, 1994, p. 158.
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Spec i a l  Fea tu re
1990), (26) although still at their own risk. (27) It was not until
October 1990 that the Taiwanese government finally allowed
investments on the mainland on condition that the capital was
routed through a front company registered in a third territory
and, following the example of the trade regulations, that Tai-
wan’s security and economy were not harmed. (28)
While this relaxing of the law initially mainly benefited ex-
port-oriented SMEs in traditional sectors (shoes, clothing,
domestic appliances, etc.), they were soon followed by the
island’s major companies, attracted both by the low cost of
labour and the enormous market on their doorstep: Chung
Shing Textile (Zhongxing fangzhi) (underwear), Inventec
(Yingyeda) (electronic dictionaries and laptops), and Wei-
chuan (Weiquan shipin) (food products) in 1991, President
(Tongyi) (food products) in 1992, Kwang Yang Motor
(Guangyang jiche) (scooters and motorbikes) in 1993,
China Motor (Zhonghua qiche) (cars and trucks) in 1994,
etc. (29) Moreover, from the mid-1990s, the electronic and
computer industries also began to invest massively on the
other side of the Strait: from 20.5 percent between 1995
and 1997, their share of investment on the mainland rose to
46.8 percent between 1998 and 2000. (30) This led to a
boom in Taiwanese investment on the other side of the
Strait: US$17.1 billion between 1991 and 2000, i.e., an av-
erage of 1.7 billion a year for 10 years. (31) The growing inte-
gration of economic activity across the Strait resulting from
these investments led to soaring trade: US$5.2 billion in
1990 and US$31.2 billion in 2000. (32)
Thus over a 15-year period China became an essential trad-
ing partner for Taiwan. (33) While in 2000 China’s share of
Taiwanese imports remained relatively low (4.4 percent, as
against 18 percent for the US and 28.2 percent for Japan),
it had become the island’s second largest export market,
with 16.5 percent, behind the US (23.4 percent) but ahead
of Japan (11.1 percent). (34) The rapprochement, not to say
the integration, between Taiwan and China increased fur-
ther in the 2000s. Acquisition of membership in the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) by the People’s Republic of
China and by Taiwan, on 16 December 2001 and 1 Janu-
ary 2002 respectively, led Taiwanese President Chen Shui-
bian to further liberalise trade between the two sides of the
Strait: (35) in July 2002, he allowed the island’s businessmen
to invest “directly” on the mainland. (36) The result was an-
other wave of investment: US$65.6 billion between 2001
and 2009, i.e, an average of US$7.3 billion per year over
nine years. (37) Trade levels then showed a new record high:
US$105.4 billion in 2008. (38) In 2002, Taiwan for the first
time exported more to China (23.3 percent) than to the US
(20.2 percent). In 2006, for the first time it imported more
from China (12.2 percent) than from the US (11.2 per-
cent). All in all, China was gradually replacing the US and
Japan: in 2009 it accounted for 30.5 percent of Taiwanese
exports, ahead of the US (11.6 percent) and Japan (7.1 per-
cent), and 14.1 percent of Taiwanese imports, still behind
Japan (20.8 percent) but ahead of the US (10.4 per-
cent). (39)The  Achi l les  hee ls  of  the  Taiwanese economy
In view of the growth shown by Taiwan in the 1990s (an av-
erage of 6.2 percent per year between 1990 and 2000), (40)
the restructuring of the Taiwanese economy seems to have
been successful. It also weathered the Asian financial crash
of 1997-1998 fairly well: (41) the rate of growth in 1998 was
3.5 percent (42) (as against a fall of 5.7 percent in South
Korea, (43) for example). However the 2000s showed more
mixed results. In terms of the balance of trade, results were
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28. Regulations Concerning the Management of Indirect Investment or Technological
Cooperation on the Mainland (Dui Dalu diqu congshi jianjie touzi huo jishu hezuo guan-
li banfa).
29. Information gathered directly by the author from the companies.
30. Investment projects approved by the MOEA. Statistics on Overseas Chinese …
(Investment Commission, MOEA, Taiwan), op. cit.
31. Investment projects approved by the MOEA. LJTY (MAC, Taiwan), op. cit.
32. LJTY (MAC, Taiwan), op. cit.
33. In 1987, the US and Japan remained by far the biggest of Taiwan’s trading partners: the
former with 21.9 percent of the island’s imports and 44.1 percent of its exports; the lat-
ter with 33.8 percent of its imports and 13 percent of its exports. At that time, China
stood very far behind: 0.8 percent of imports; 2.3 percent of exports. (US, Japan) TSDB,
1997, op. cit., pp. 199 and 201; (China) LJTY (MAC, Taiwan), op. cit.
34. US, Japan: TSDB, 2009, op. cit., pp. 227 and 229; China: LJTY (MAC, Taiwan), 
op. cit.
35. In November 2001, he announced the guidelines of his mainland policy: “Active open-
ing, effective management” (jiji kaifang, youxiao guanli).
36. In fact, entrepreneurs still had the possibility of investing “indirectly” through a front
company in order to protect their capital. Jiun-mei Tien, “Policy implication of liberaliz-
ing direct investment in mainland China,” Liang’an jingmao yuekan (LJY) (Straits
Business Monthly) [Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), Taiwan], August 2002, pp. 3-7.
37. Investment projects approved by the MOEA. LJTY (MAC, Taiwan), op. cit.
38. LJTY (MAC, Taiwan), op. cit.
39. (US, Japan) Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT, Taiwan), Trade Statistics, http://eweb.trade.
gov.tw; (Chine) LJTY (MAC, Taiwan), op. cit.
40. GDP, constant 2006 prices in NTD. Calculation based on SANA, DGBAS, op. cit.
41. If the Taiwanese economy reacted fairly well to this crisis, it was because the island’s
industrial structure was dominated by SMEs, and these did not have an excessive debt
ratio. Min-Hsu Chen, “How Could Taiwan Have Been Insulated from the 1997 Financial
Crisis?”, NPF Research Report (National Policy Foundation, Taiwan), 11 September
2001, http://old.npf.org.tw.
42. SANA, DGBAS, op. cit.
43. GDP, constant 2005 prices in won. Principal Economic Indicators (PEI), March 2010,
Economic Statistics Department, The Bank of Korea, http://eng.bok.or.kr.
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The Taiwanese Economy After the Miracle
better than in the previous decade: four years between
US$21.3 billion (2006) 29.3 billion (2009), and six years
between US$11.2 billion (2000) and 15.8 billion (2005)
(in the 1990s there had been four years between US$12.5
billion (1990) and 14.4 billion (1996), and six years be-
tween US$7.4 billion (1998) and 9.8 billion (1992)). (44) At
the same time, growth slowed noticeably, to an annual aver-
age of 3.1 percent between 2000 and 2009. (45) Actually, this
figure needs to be interpreted with caution. Firstly, it con-
ceals strong annual variations: six years between 3.7 percent
(2003) and 6.2 percent (2004), one year at 0.7 percent
(2008), and two years of negative growth (– 1.7 percent in
2001 and – 1.9 percent in 2009). (46) It also reflects to some
extent the increasing maturity of the Taiwanese economy,
with the island’s macroeconomic conditions now similar to
those of industrialised countries. Nevertheless, it remains
symptomatic of the weaknesses the dotcom bubble of 2001
and the financial crash of 2008-2009 helped to reveal (as a
comparison, growth in South Korea was 4 percent in 2001,
2.3 percent in 2008 and 0.2 percent in 2009). (47) Another
revealing sign of the difficulties faced by the island’s econ-
omy is falling market share abroad. In the US, Taiwan fell
from 7th place (3.3 percent of the American market) in 2000
to 9th place (1.8 percent of the American market) in 2009;
and in Japan from 4th place (4.7 percent of the Japanese
market) to 8th place (3.3 percent of the Japanese market). (48)
Taiwanese products’ share of ASEAN imports (49) fell from
4.9 percent in 2000 (50) to 4.4 percent in 2009; (51) in China’s
imports it fell from 11.1 percent in 2000 to 6.2 percent in
2009. (52)
These problems are the result of at least three structural
weaknesses affecting the Taiwanese economy: unbalanced
growth, over-dependence on foreign technology, and a short-
age of internationally-recognised brands. Unbalanced growth
appears in both the excessive weight of foreign trade and the
sectoral and regional over-concentration of exports. During
the 2000s, the contribution of foreign trade to economic
growth was much greater than that of the domestic market:
between 2000 and 2009, four-fifths of real growth was fed
by net export growth, (53) and only one fifth by growth in do-
mestic demand. (54) While this situation originates partly in
the fact that Taiwan has traditionally depended on its foreign
trade, it is also explained by lower increases in income dur-
ing the 2000s than in the 1990s. Between 2000 and 2008,
salaries rose by an average of only 0.2 percent per year (as
against 5.5 percent between 1990 and 2000) in the informa-
tion and communications sector, and average of only 0.3 per-
cent per year (as against 5.4 percent in 1990-2000) in the
accommodation and food services sector. (55) National in-
come per capita (56) (based on constant 2006 prices in NTD)
rose only by a yearly average of 1.1 percent during 2000-
2009 (as opposed to 4.8 percent in 1990-2000), (57) which is
to say at a slightly slower rate than in South Korea (2.7 per-
cent, (58) in won at constant 2005 prices). (59) Moreover, in
2009, while the machine and electric equipment industry ac-
counted for 46.8 percent of the island’s exports (including
27.8 percent of electronic products), (60) China, Hong Kong,
the US, and Japan together received 59.8 percent of Tai-
wanese exports. (61)
The second weakness in the Taiwanese economy lies in the
fact that, despite the government’s efforts to promote R&D,
Taiwan has remained in most cases dependent on Ameri-
can, Japanese, and even Korean companies for key technol-
ogy. In the 1990s, the island had to import central process-
ing units (CPUs) and random access memory (RAM), two
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44. 1990-2008: TSDB, 2009, op. cit., p. 216; 2009: BOFT, Taiwan, Trade Statistics, op. cit.
45. GDP, constant 2006 prices in NTD. Calculation based on SANA, DGBAS, op. cit.
46. GDP, constant 2006 prices in NTD. SANA, DGBAS, op. cit.
47. GDP, constant 2005 prices in won. PEI, The Bank of Korea, op. cit.
48. MOEA (Taiwan), Quanqiu taishang fuwu wang (QTFW) (Website for Taiwanese entrepre-
neurs worldwide), http://twbusiness.nat.gov.tw.
49. Referring to the “ASEAN 5,” Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore.
50. Guomaoju (BOFT, Taiwan), “Bashijiu nian duiwai maoyi fazhan gaikuang” (The
Development of [Taiwanese] Foreign Trade in 2000), 5 July 2001, http://cweb.trade
.gov.tw.
51. Guomaoju (BOFT, Taiwan), “2009 nian duiwai maoyi fazhan gaikuang” (The
Development of [Taiwanese] Foreign Trade in 2009), 26 May 2010, http://cweb.trade
.gov.tw.
52. Total imports, Chinese Customs: QTFW (MOEA, Taiwan), op. cit.; (imports of Taiwanese
products, MAC estimate) LJTY (MAC, Taiwan), op. cit.
53. Rate of growth in exports – rate of growth in imports.
54. Average annual growth rates: GDP = + 3.1 percent; “net” exports = + 2.5 percent;
domestic demand (private consumption + public consumption + gross formation of
fixed capital) = + 0.6 percent. Calculation based on SANA, DGBAS, op. cit.
55. Average monthly salary per employee: information and communications, NTD 36,866 in
1990; NTD 62,759 in 2000; NTD 63,888 in 2008; accommodation and food services,
NTD 15,448 in 1990; NTD 26,060 in 2000; NTD 26,747 in 2008. TSDB, 2009, op. cit.,
p. 41.
56. National income (NI) = gross national product (GNP) – taxes linked to production – con-
sumption of fixed capital (= depreciation undergone by fixed capital).
57. SANA, DGBAS, op. cit.
58. Calculation based on PEI, The Bank of Korea, op. cit.
59. It should be pointed out, however, that GDP per capita measured in parity of purchasing
power remained higher in Taiwan (US$31,834) than in South Korea (US$27,978) in
2009. World Economic Outlook Database, http://www.imf.org.
60. MOEA (Taiwan), Statistics of Economic, Economic Indicators, http://www.moea
.gov.tw.
61. China: 30.5 percent; US: 11.6 percent; Hong Kong: 10.6 percent; Japan: 7.1 percent.
(US, Japan) BOFT, Taiwan, Trade Statistics, op. cit.; (China, Hong Kong) LJTY (MAC,
Taiwan), op. cit. Taiwan is doubly dependent on the American and Japanese markets:
directly in the case of Taiwanese finished products exported to these two markets, but
above all indirectly in the case of semi-finished Taiwanese products exported to China
and Hong Kong, which after assembly are re-exported to the US and Japan.
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essential components amounting to at least half of the produc-
tion cost of a computer. (62) In the beginning of the 2000s it
was the technology of thin-film-transistor liquid crystal dis-
plays (TFT-LCDs), essential to the manufacture of desktops
and laptops, that Taiwanese manufacturers lacked. Although
the latter had acquired this technology from foreign (espe-
cially Japanese) firms (Acer (Hongji) from IBM Japan,
Quanta Computer (Guangda diannao) from Sharp,
Chunghwa Picture Tubes (Zhonghua yingguan) from Mit-
subishi, HannStar Display (Hanyu caijing) from Toshiba,
etc.), (63) the Japanese and the Koreans were confident that
they could maintain their technological advance, hence the
necessity for the island’s companies to import electronic
equipment and components in large quantities. Between
2000 and 2008, Taiwan imported around US$570 billion
worth of electric machines and equipment (37.9 percent of
the island’s total imports). Key electronic components such
as cathode valves and tubes, diodes and liquid crystals
amounted to 42.5 percent (242 billion) of this, with over half
of the components coming from Japan (18.1 percent), South
Korea (17.5 percent), and the US (14.5 percent). (64) Over
this period, two of Taiwan’s biggest trade deficits were with
Japan and South Korea, amounting between 2000 and
2008, to US$220.7 billion and 49.3 billion respectively. (65)
The third weakness in the Taiwanese economy is the virtual
absence of recognised brands at the international level. The
roots of this situation are doubtless to be found in the strat-
egy adopted in the 1960s by most Taiwanese companies that
developed in the shadow of the multinationals—especially
American and Japanese—with which they signed OEM con-
tracts, and which gave them access to new technologies and
to distribution networks abroad. While some subsequently
moved on to Original Design Manufacturing (ODM) con-
tracts that allowed them to take on product design (66) as well,
very few adopted an Original Brand Manufacturing (OBM)
strategy calling for the development of their own brand (Acer
and Asus-Huashuo) are two examples in the IT industry, but
they are exceptions). Moreover, even if they did so, they
rarely gave up their OEM and/or ODM contracts. (67) While
this model allowed the island’s SMEs to develop what be-
came for them a kind of intangible asset—the flexibility to
react rapidly to market stimuli and the ability to satisfy client
demands in terms of price, quality and delivery deadlines (68)—it
usually kept them under the control of their clients, who were
careful to maintain their advantage in terms of technology
and/or marketing.
These Achilles heels have made the Taiwanese economy ex-
tremely sensitive to any change in the international environ-
ment. The weakness of internal demand prevents the domes-
tic market from properly absorbing shocks from outside. In
the 1990s, while investing in China allowed the island’s en-
trepreneurs to meet competition by increasing their produc-
tion capacity and reducing costs through economies of scale,
they did not succeed in gaining genuine control of key tech-
nologies or markets. (69) The need to import technology is a
weight on the balance of trade and therefore on growth. In
the context of increased competition on the world market
(China, Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia, as well as
Central America, South America, and Eastern Europe),
Taiwanese companies have had trouble maintaining market
share abroad. In the US and Japan, low and middle-range
Taiwanese consumer goods are increasingly uncompetitive
compared to Chinese products: China climbed in the US
from 4th place in 2000 (8.2 percent of imports) to first place
in 2009 (19 percent); and in Japan from 2nd place in 2000
(13.8 percent) to 1st place in 2009 (22.2 percent) in
Japan. (70) In China, although some Taiwanese firms have
managed to promote their own brands, like Ting-Hsin with
their Kang Shih Fu instant noodles, Chinese consumers
tend to favour major Japanese brands (in the case of high
earners), or Korean brands such as Samsung or LG (for av-
erage and low earners). (71)
In the face of the island’s economic problems, President Ma
Ying-jeou has launched the idea of an economic zone bring-
ing China and Taiwan together under the ECFA, a frame-
work agreement for China-Taiwan economic cooperation.
According to the Kuomintang government, the agreement
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62. Yeo Lin, 2003, op. cit., p. 21.
63. Charles S. Lee, “Headlong Plunge,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 June 1999, pp.
84-86.
64. TSDB, 2009, op. cit., pp. 245 and 250.
65. Taiwan’s trade deficit with Saudi Arabia (totalling US$55.9 billion between 2000 and
2008) is essentially attributable to energy imports. Calculation based on TSDB, 2009, op.
cit., pp. 222-226.
66. At the end of the 1990s, Quanta Computer designed and manufactured PCs for IBM,
Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Apple, and Siemens. China News, 5 February 1999, p. 7.
67. Even after developing its own brand, Acer continued to work as a subcontractor for a
dozen foreign companies, including Fujitsu, Hitachi, and IBM. Charles S. Lee, 1999, 
op. cit., p. 84.
68. Tain-Jy Chen (ed.), Taiwanese Firms in Southeast Asia: Networking Across Borders,
Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, US, Edward Elgar, New Horizons in International
Business, 1998, pp. 36-37 and 50-52.
69. Lai Jianyu, “Zouchu chao ‘men’ shi nian xunzhao Taiwan xin pingheng yaofang” (In
search of a new remedy to come out of [a period of] ten years of deep gloom and pro-
vide Taiwan with balanced development, Tianxia zazhi (CommonWealth), No. 439,
January 2010, http://www.cw.com.tw.
70. QTFW (MOEA, Taiwan), op. cit.
71. Taiwan Institute of Economic Research (TIER), “Jinrong haixiao hou Taiwan chanye zai
chufa” (After the Financial Tsunami, the Taiwanese Economy Starts up Again), Taipei,
TIER, Jingji pinglun (Economic Assessment), Taijing shelun (TIER Editorial), January
2010, http://www.tier.org.tw.
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will help normalise economic relations between the two
sides of the Strait, while also preventing Taiwan from being
marginalised by the free trade areas being set up around the
ASEAN: (72) ASEAN + 1 (China), ASEAN + 3 (China,
Japan, South Korea), and even ASEAN + 6 (China,
Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand). (73)
The island’s government hopes that the ECFA will be a first
step allowing Taiwan to participate in the economic integra-
tion emerging in the Asia Pacific region. However, the proj-
ect is far from being unanimously supported in Taiwan,
where the opposition, led by the Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), (74)
are calling for a referendum on the issue. Indeed, the ECFA
raises a number of questions on both the economic and po-
litical level.ECFA, an economically  unsat isfactory solution
While it is true that the 2000s saw an increase in the num-
ber of free trade areas around the world, (75) it is too simplis-
tic to attribute the island’s economic problems only to the
fact that Taiwan has to a large extent remained outside this
trend. It is indeed true that free trade agreements such as
those signed and being applied—between the ASEAN and
China in 2005 and between the ASEAN and South Korea
in 2007—contribute to reducing the competitiveness of Tai-
wanese products in the region: in 2009, South Korea over-
took Taiwan in Southeast Asia (ASEAN 5) with a 5.1 per-
cent market share (4.4 percent for Taiwan), when Taiwan
was ahead in 2007 with 5.2 percent market share (4.7 per-
cent for South Korea). (76) One might therefore think that
projects such as “ASEAN+3” and “ASEAN+6” might fur-
ther disadvantage Taiwanese business. Yet the situation is
more complex than it appears.
Firstly, these free trade agreements have up to now operated
only on the margins. On the one hand, the proportion of
Taiwanese products among China’s imports began to fall
from 1997 onward (15.8 percent in 1997, 11.1 percent in
2000, 8.5 percent in 2005, 6.2 percent in 2009). (77) On the
other, the island’s exporters are not as isolated as all that.
For example, under the Information Technology Agreement
(ITA) signed in the framework of the WTO, a considerable
portion of Taiwanese exports to the US, Japan, the
ASEAN, China, Hong Kong, South Korea, etc., are al-
ready exempt from tariff barriers. (78) In other words, the
slowing of growth in Taiwan in the 2000s is no doubt ex-
plained not so much by the island’s marginalisation from the
current movement towards regional economic integration, as
by the structural weaknesses of the Taiwanese economy.
From this point of view, the ECFA is far from providing an
overall solution, which would more likely involve the con-
struction of a more balanced development model that would
seek among other things to restore the importance of domes-
tic demand, to diversify both economic activity (tourism,
green energy, etc.) and export markets, (79) to develop inno-
vative technology that would allow the manufacture of more
profitable upmarket products with less competition on the
world market, and to promote Taiwanese brands abroad.
Secondly, while all else being equal, the ECFA should be
profitable to the island’s exporters because of the planned
reduction in entry duties to the Chinese market, particularly
in sectors such as petrochemicals, steel, and textiles, the col-
lateral effects it could produce on the Taiwanese economy
are far from insignificant. Farmers, as well as Taiwanese
SMEs in traditional sectors that produce mainly for the do-
mestic market (such as hosiery, shoes, bags, consumer elec-
tronics, etc.), are in danger of being hit by the massive ar-
rival of Chinese products in Taiwan. (80) Symbolising this
question is opposition to the ECFA by sock manufacturers
in Shetou County’s Changhua District. The Taiwanese gov-
ernment, aware of this, has promised not to add to the list of
Chinese agricultural products that can be imported to the is-
land, (81) and to allow for an adjustment period for the most
41N o  2 0 1 0 / 3
72. The founding members of the ASEAN were Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the
Philippines and Thailand. The organisation was subsequently joined by Brunei, Vietnam,
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar (Burma).
73. Gao Chang, Li Tiansheng, “ECFA yu liang’an jingmao guanxi zhanwang” (Prospect of
economic and trade relations between the two sides of the strait in the framework of
the ECFA), LJY (SEF, Taiwan), March 2010, http://www.seftb.org.
74. Taiwan tuanjie lianmeng: Taiwan Solidarity Union.
75. According to the WTO, 148 agreements (Free Trade Agreement, Regional Trade
Agreement) for the establishment of free trade areas were signed worldwide between
2000 and 2008. Jingjibu (MOEA, Taiwan), “Liang’an jingji xieyi zhi neihan ji keneng
yingxiang” (Contents and possible effects of the ECFA), LJY (SEF, Taiwan), March 2010,
http://www.seftb.org.
76. Guomaoju (BOFT, Taiwan), 26 May 2010, op. cit.; Guomaoju (BOFT, Taiwan), “2007 nian
Zhonghua minguo duiwai maoyi fazhan gaikuang” (The development of the Republic of
China’s foreign trade in 2007), 19 May 2008, http://cweb.trade.gov.tw.
77. (Total imports, Chinese Customs) QTFW (MOEA, Taiwan), op. cit.; (imports of Taiwanese
products, MAC estimate) LJTY (MAC, Taiwan), op. cit.
78. Taiwan was among the first 29 initial signatories of the ITA (there are now 70). The
objective of this agreement, initially signed in Singapore in December 1996, is to pro-
mote the development of IT by abolishing customs duties on products of the sectors
concerned. “Information Technology Agreement – Introduction” (http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/inftec_e/itaintro_e.htm); “Ministerial Declaration on Trade in
Information Technology Products” (http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
itadec_e.htm), 3 June 2010.
79. TIER, “Jinrong haixiao hou Taiwan chanye zai chufa,” January 2010, op. cit
80. Coral Lee “L’ECFA, la solution miracle ?”, Taiwan aujourd’hui, vol. 26, no. 9, September
2009, pp. 17-19.
81. Gao Chang, Li Tiansheng, 2010, op. cit.
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threatened industries. (82) There is also the example of Hong
Kong, where rapprochement with China certainly benefited
local tourism, but also drained part of the territory’s capital
and talent towards the mainland. (83) The services sector,
which in 2008 accounted for no less than 73.3 percent of
GDP and 58 percent of jobs, (84) also feels threatened. The
fear is that if Taiwan agrees to recognise Chinese qualifica-
tions and allows Chinese workers to sit competitive examina-
tions allowing them to practice law, accountancy, or architec-
ture on the island, there will be a fall in the quality of serv-
ices provided as well as in incomes. (85) Lastly, there remains
the question of whether signing the ECFA will in fact allow
Taiwan to sign free trade agreements with other countries.
At the moment there is no certainty, although during the
first televised debate on the ECFA on 5 April 2010 the
head of the Taiwanese negotiating team, Huang Chih-peng,
stated that a number of States — which he did not wish to
name — had already made it known that they were ready to
discuss such a prospect with Taipei if political tensions be-
tween the two sides of the Strait diminished. (86) Conse-
quently, the effects of the ECFA on the Taiwanese economy
as a whole can be objectively assessed only by weighing up
the advantages in terms of regional integration against the
disadvantages in terms of competition on the domestic mar-
ket and of the draining of resources. A po lit ica lly  s ensi t ive  agreement
Controversial on an economic level, the ECFA is also ex-
tremely sensitive on a political level, for while the Taiwanese
certainly wish to take advantage of the Chinese economy for
their own development, they are also afraid that China may
seek to control the island through the economy. (87)
Up to now, it must be recognised that Chinese economic
power has proved to be more of an opportunity than a threat
to Taiwan. It is true that the move towards liberalisation of
trade across the Strait, which began with the recognition by
the Taiwanese government of indirect trade (1985) and in-
vestment (1990), followed by the establishment of the extra-
territorial maritime centre at Kaohsiung (Gaoxiong gang jing-
wai hangyun zhongxin), which made possible the first semi-
direct sea connections between the two sides in April
1997, (88) and then by the opening of “small” direct connec-
tions (xiao san tong) in January 2002, (89) led to an upsurge
in Taiwanese investments on the mainland: 37,771 Tai-
wanese companies invested US$82.7 billion between 1991
and 2009 according to official Taiwanese sources. (90) It is
equally true that the island’s increased dependence on China
resulting from these investments has not in any way hindered
the implementation of democratic reforms in Taiwan, and
that these have tended to give the island more independence
by institutionally distancing the two sides of the Strait.
Why then does the ECFA produce political waves? Proba-
bly because it tends to accentuate the threat represented by
China. While in a way it forms part of the move towards
trade liberalisation across the Strait that began in the
1980s, (91) it goes much further than anything done previ-
ously. The agreement on financial cooperation signed in
April 2009 should allow China to invest massively in Taiwan
(“direct” or “portfolio” investment), including in a sector as
sensitive as property. (92) To Beijing, the economy is an instru-
ment in the service of political ambition. The Provisional
Regulation on the Development of Trade with Taiwan, (93)
dating from May 1979, already stated: “The objective of
trade with Taiwan by joining the world of industry and com-
merce is to promote economic union between the two sides
of the Strait, and thus the return of Taiwan to the fold of the
Mother Country […]”. (94) The pressure brought to bear by
Beijing on ASEAN countries to discourage them from sign-
ing free trade agreements with Taiwan is part of the same
strategy. The ECFA project is an opportunity for the Com-
munist government to lay the foundations for economic re-
unification, the first stage on the road to political reunifica-
42 N o  2 0 1 0 / 3
82. Guomaoju (BOFT, Taiwan), “Liang’an jingji hezuo jiagou xieyi jieshao” (Introduction to the
ECFA), 28 September 2009, http://cweb.trade.gov.tw.
83. Coral Lee, 2009, op. cit., pp. 18-19. 
84. TSDB, 2009, op. cit., pp. 35 and 60.
85. Ziyou shibao, “Qi zhi chuan chan, lü: ECFA chongji 321 wan bailing” (Are traditional
industries the only ones concerned? The Greens (= DPP + TSU) say NO: the ECFA threat-
ens 3.21 million white collar workers), Ziyou shibao, 6 April 2010.
86. Taiwan Info, “ECFA: the government is struggling to convince,” 6 April 2010, http://tai-
waninfo.nat.gov.tw. 
87. This was not a new fear, since former President Lee Teng-hui in September 1996 was
already exhorting businessmen not to invest too much on the mainland with the slogan:
“No haste, be patient!” (jie ji yong ren). 
88. Between Kaohsiung and Fuzhou / Xiamen, on Lee Teng-hui’‘s initiative.
89. Between Quemoy (Kinmen) / Matsu and Quanzhou, on Chen Shui-bian’s initiative.
90. Investment projects approved by the MOEA. LJTY (MAC, Taiwan), op. cit. These figures
are certainly an under-estimate.
91. The agreements on direct air and sea links signed by the Straits Exchange Foundation
(SEF) (Haijihui) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS)
(Haixiehui) in November 2008 are from this perspective no more than a further step in
the process of normalisation of economic relations between Taiwan and China. Gao
Chang, Li Tiansheng, 2010, op. cit.
92. Gao Chang, Li Tiansheng, 2010, op. cit 
93. Guanyu kaizhan dui Taiwan maoyi de zanxing guiding.
94. The objective of reunification was firmly recalled by the Chinese government in March
2005 by means of the Anti-Secession Law (Fan fenlie guojia fa), which established the
principle of military intervention against Taiwan in case of a declaration of independ-
ence.
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tion. Moreover, while the Kuomintang government presents
the ECFA as essential for the future of the Taiwanese econ-
omy, the Communist government for its part does not refer
to the imperious necessity of this agreement for the future of
the Chinese economy. (95) To Beijing, it clearly has a politi-
cal objective: that of reunification.
It is true that the economic rapprochement between Taiwan
and China is a long-term trend that goes beyond the parti-
san interests of the Kuomintang or the DPP. Firstly, invest-
ment on the Chinese mainland satisfies a real need for Tai-
wanese companies. Secondly, the process of normalisation
of economic relations across the Strait is incumbent on Tai-
wan since the island joined the WTO. Finally, the growing
power of the Chinese economy on the world scene makes it
unavoidable, whatever the country involved. However, the
ECFA as such has major political significance. Of course it
does not automatically imply reunification between the two
sides of the Strait. By hooking Taiwan “economically” to
China, however, it might reduce the probability of Tai-
wanese de jure independence in the future. This is why the
ECFA appeals more to supporters of unification and worries
supporters of the island’s independence.
The televised debate on 25 April 2010 between Ma Ying-
jeou and the president of the DPP, Tsai Ying-wen, dealt at
length with the economic stakes of the ECFA, with Ma un-
derlining in particular the urgency of such an agreement and
its advantages in terms of commercial benefits and renewed
investment, while Tsai came out against any hasty action in
order to leave time for fragile local industries to adjust, and
in favour of trying to rebalance the island’s export trade in
the multilateral framework of the WTO. Nonetheless, dur-
ing this debate the President of the Republic himself recog-
nised the political dimension of the agreement when he re-
called his commitment to “protect the sovereignty of the Re-
public of China (and) to protect Taiwan’s dignity” (hanwei
Zhonghua minguo zhuquan, hanwei Taiwan zunyan). (96)
The ECFA, which the Kuomintang government presents as
a purely economic agreement, could thus eventually give rise
to new political tension. If Ma Ying-jeou maintains his offi-
cial policy as symbolised by the slogan “No reunification, no
independence, no conflict” (bu tong, bu du, bu wu), then
the ECFA contains the seeds of misunderstanding between
the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. On the
other hand, if the hope of Ma Ying-jeou (and of the 
Kuomintang) is for the reunification of Taiwan with China,
then the ECFA contains the seeds of misunderstanding be-
tween the Kuomintang and the population of Taiwan, the
majority of whom are opposed to the idea.
Conclus ion
In view of the history of relations between the two sides of
the Strait, the economic integration of Taiwan with China is
not an exceptional phenomenon. Over past centuries, the is-
land has made several return journeys within the Chinese
economic sphere. (97) Spurred by economic forces and busi-
ness needs, the liberalisation of trade across the Strait under-
way over the past 25 years has also been globally beneficial
to Taiwan in that it has helped the island’s entrepreneurs
face evolving macroeconomic conditions and the restructur-
ing of Taiwanese industry. But this movement has its draw-
backs. On the one hand, by enabling the maintenance of rel-
atively high growth during the 1990s, it helped hide struc-
tural weaknesses in the Taiwanese economy that only be-
came visible in the major recessions of the 2000s. On the
other hand, by making the island increasingly economically
dependent on the Chinese mainland, it revived the debate
on the question of Taiwan’s independence.
While President Ma Ying-jeou’s project for a China–Taiwan
economic zone is likely to help kick-start growth in Taiwan
by generating investment on both sides of the Strait, it
nonetheless has several major downsides. Firstly, it does not
directly tackle the weaknesses afflicting the island’s econ-
omy. Secondly, its overall economic impact remains uncer-
tain. Everything will depend on how the Kuomintang gov-
ernment negotiates the content of the ECFA, which for the
moment is merely a framework to be gradually filled out.
Prudent (or perhaps worried?), Taiwan has already asked
the Chinese government to insert a clause allowing interrup-
tion of the process in case of failure to respect the terms of
the agreement. (98) Finally, the ECFA puts the Taiwanese
government in a position of weakness in relation to the Com-
munist government to the extent that the negotiations are
lopsided: not only is China much more of an economic
heavyweight than Taiwan, but the Chinese authorities con-
tinue to threaten the island militarily.
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For all that, does the ECFA pose a real political danger to
Taiwan? Probably not in terms of domestic politics: Tai-
wan’s democracy is now well established and is not likely to
be called into question. The public will, moreover, speak out
during the legislative and presidential elections in 2012, with
the prospect of a change in policy towards the mainland if
the opposition wins. The ECFA could, however, influence
the island’s foreign policy by orienting it primarily towards
China, and incite the Taiwanese authorities to keep a low
profile in order not to irritate a “partner” who is all the more
demanding for being in a strong position. •
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Glossary
Bijixing diannao lianmeng 筆記型電腦聯盟
bu tong, bu du, bu wu 不統、不獨、不武
Changhua 彰化
dianzi gongye fazhan zhongxin 電子工業發展中心
Dui Dalu diqu congshi jianjie touzi huo jishu hezuo guanli banfa
對大陸地區從事間接投資或技術合作管理辦法
Dui Gang Ao diqu zhuankou maoyi san jiben yuanze
對港澳地區轉口貿易三基本原則
Fan fenlie guojia fa 反分裂國家法
Gaoxiong gang jingwai hangyun zhongxin 高雄港境外航運中心
Gongyanyuan dianzi suo 工研院電子所
Gongye jishu yanjiuyuan 工業技術研究院
Guangda diannao 廣達電腦
Guangyang jiche 光陽機車
Guanyu kaizhan dui Taiwan maoyi de zanxing guiding
關於開展對臺灣貿易的暫行規定
Haijihui 海基會
Haixiehui 海協會
hanwei Zhonghua minguo zhuquan, hanwei Taiwan zunyan
捍衛中華民國主權、捍衛臺灣尊嚴
Hanyu caijing 瀚宇彩晶
Hongji 宏碁
Huabang dianzi 華邦電子
Huang Chih-peng 黃志鵬
Huashuo 華碩
Jianlong dianqi dian 建隆電氣店
jie ji yong ren 戒急用忍
jiji kaifang, youxiao guanli 積極開放、有效管理
Kang Shih Fu 康師傅
Liang’an jingji hezuo jiagou xieyi 兩岸經濟合作架構協議
Lianhua dianzi 聯華電子
Matsu 馬祖
Minnan 閩南
Quanzhou 泉州
Quemoy (Kinmen) 金門
Shetou 社頭
Shijie xianjin jiti dianlu 世界先進積體電路
Songxia dianqi (Matsushita denki) 松下電器
Taisong gongye 臺松工業
Taiwan jiti dianlu 臺灣積體電路
Taiwan songxia dianqi 臺灣松下電器
Taiwan tuanjie lianmeng 臺灣團結聯盟
Ting-Hsin 頂新
Tongyi 統一
Weiquan shipin 味全食品
xiao san tong 小三通
Xinzhu kexue gongye yuanqu 新竹科學工業園區
Yang Ting-yuan 楊丁元
Yingyeda 英業達
Zhonghua qiche 中華汽車
Zhonghua yingguan 中華映管
Zhongxing fangzhi 中興紡織
